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6.1  Introduction 
Since the late 1970s, the Japanese financial system has been gradually but 
steadily  liberalized.  Japan entered the “era of financial liberalization” in the 
1980s. As will be explained to some extent in this paper,  foreign  exchange 
transactions were greatly liberalized, thereby spurring the internationalization 
of Japanese financial markets. Full-scale liberalization of interest rates, which 
used to be covered by the Temporary Law of Interest Rate Adjustment (1947), 
was started in 1984 when the Japanese government placed the deregulation of 
interest rates on the  agenda for the  U.S.-Japan  Yen-Dollar Committee.’ By 
1993 almost all bank deposit rates except for small-denominated and demand 
deposits had been liberalized. In October  1994 the remaining regulations on 
deposit interest rates were removed, except for that on “current deposits” (to~a- 
y~kin).~  The Japanese financial system is far more market-oriented than it was 
in the high-growth period from the early 1950s to the beginning of the 1970s, 
and it seems certain that financial liberalization has improved the efficiency of 
the Japanese economy. 
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I. See Frankel (1984) for a detailed explanation of the agreement of the Yen/Dollar Committee. 
The primary objective of this committee was to realign the Japanese yen, which was regarded as 
substantially undervalued. But, as Frankel points out, it was ambiguous whether the liberalization 
of Japanese financial markets and other “structural policies” included in the agreement were effec- 
tive in amending the undervaluation of the yen. 
2. Regarding the recent process of interest deregulation, see Federation of Bankers Associations 
of Japan (1994, 86-94). 
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However, it is noteworthy that Japan’s financial liberalization has been char- 
acterized by “gradualism.” The monetary authorities have been in part skepti- 
cal about the efficiency of the market mechanism and in part worried about the 
anticipated “destructive impact” of free market mechanisms on the status quo 
in the financial system. Therefore, they have controlled its implementation so 
as to avoid radical changes in the conventional framework of the financial sys- 
tem, and to preserve the equilibrium attained among various vested interests 
in the financial sector. For example, despite the apparent process of liberalizing 
interest rates, most Japanese financial markets, particularly the bank deposit 
market, seem to be far from “contestable” because the regulatory segregation 
of various financial businesses from one another effectively prevents full-scale 
competition. Therefore, the benefits of interest rate liberalization have not yet 
been fully realized. The remaining regulation via financial segregation symbol- 
izes the gradualism of Japan’s financial liberalization.? 
This gradua1il;m may have contributed to superficially stabilizing the Japa- 
nese financial system, as the authorities intended. It should be noted, however, 
that  this  gradualism  gives  a  distorted  nature  to the  financial  liberalization, 
which can be regarded as the cost of liberalization in Japan. In order to evaluate 
Japan’s financial liberalization since the early 1980s, we should not neglect the 
cost of gradualism. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the cost by focus- 
ing on the process of liberalization in the Japanese corporate bond market. 
Japanese corporate finance was dominated by indirect finance centered on 
bank lending  for the  nearly 40  years  between  the  early  1940s and the late 
1970s. However, figure 6.1 and table 6.1 indicate that its structure has under- 
gone remarkable changes since the late 1970s. The most conspicuous changes 
were a steady decrease in major firms’ reliance on borrowing from banks and 
a corresponding increase in the amount of bond issues. We might say that Japa- 
nese corporate finance has been substantially “securitized” during the last de- 
cade. In particular, major Japanese companies issued convertible bonds inten- 
sively to raise funds in the latter half of the  1980s. According to figure 6.2, 
almost half of all corporate bonds were issued in the form of convertible bonds 
during this period. Thus, the securitization of Japan’s corporate finance during 
the last decade was accompanied by a surge in convertible bond is~ues.~ 
The policy of liberalizing the corporate bond market accounts for this pro- 
cess of securitization. As will be seen in section 6.2,  the ability of Japanese 
firms to issue corporate bonds has been strictly controlled since the 1930s. But 
the internationalization of financial markets exerted great pressure on domestic 
bond markets in the early  1980s, thereby promoting their liberalization. The 
restrictive  control of  corporate bond  issues has since been relaxed,  and the 
3. The Financial System Reform Law of  1992 enforced in April 1993 allows financial institu- 
tions to compete in each other’s spheres via subsidiaries. However, the entry of various financial 
institutions into other spheres has been controlled by the MOF. The MOF determines which finan- 
cial institutions are allowed entry into other spheres at what time, 
4. Hoshi (1993) shows that  Japan’s major firms tended to decrease borrowing from banks by 
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Fig. 6.2  Corporate bonds issued by Japanese firms, F.Y.  1979-92 
Source: Koshnsai Yoran (Handbook of Japanese Bonds) (Tokyo: Nomura Research Institute, vari- 
ous years). 
Table 6.1  Components of Fund-Raising by Major Companiesd  in Japan 
(average %) 
Period  Stocks  Bonds  Loans  Internal Fundq  Other  Total 
1961-70  6.1  5.6  37.7  32.4  18.4  100.0 
197 1-75  4.0  7.0  42.6  33.8  12.6  100.0 
1976-80  8.0  8.1  20.9  50.7  12.4  100.0 
1981-85  11.4  10.5  11.7  61.2  5.3  100.0 
1986-92  I 1.6  17.6  8.4  51.0  11.4  100.0 
Soirrcet BOJ (various issues). 
”“Major companies” refers to about 600 firms chosen from the group of  listed companies whose 
book  value of  equity  capital is  more than Yl.0 billion. Financial  institution5 are not  included 
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number of big firms allowed to issue bonds in domestic markets has gradually 
been increased. 
Thus, the surge in bond issues in the 1980s may seem to be a natural re- 
sponse by Japanese  corporations to liberalization  in the bond  markets. The 
standard theory of corporate finance, however, cannot sufficiently account for 
this phenomenon. In this paper, we propose a hypothesis to explain the surge 
in convertible bond issues in the late 1980s. The hypothesis relates the active 
issue of convertible bonds by Japanese firms to the combination of an imper- 
fect mechanism of corporate governance and the distorted or half-finished na- 
ture of the corporate bond market liberalization. 
First, it can be argued that the possibility of issuing convertible bonds miti- 
gated the constraints of bankruptcy for corporate managers, thus encouraging 
them to issue convertibles. According to our hypothesis, the rapid increase in 
convertible and warrant bond issues in the late 1980s was related to imperfect 
corporate governance in Japan. 
Second, the process of liberalizing the domestic corporate bond market was 
distorted during the 1980s in the sense that only well-established major compa- 
nies were allowed to issue convertible and other equity-related bonds. In the- 
ory, such instruments are most useful for small and relatively newly established 
enterprises, in order to overcome the agency problem due to asymmetric infor- 
mation. However, such firms were effectively excluded from domestic corpo- 
rate bond markets during the recent gradual process of liberalization. This pa- 
per will argue that the distortion due to the gradualism of liberalization led to 
the surge in equity-related  bond  issues by  major companies  in Japan under 
conditions of imperfect corporate governance. 
This paper is organized as follows: In section 6.2, we present a rough sketch 
of the evolution of Japanese corporate bond markets from the early postwar 
period to the late 1980s. In particular, we explain the process of relaxing eligi- 
bility requirements for corporate bond issues and emphasize its distorted na- 
ture. In section 6.3, we take up the question of why equity-related bonds, and 
convertibles in particular, were issued so actively during the second half of the 
1980s. We  propose  a simple hypothesis  of  imperfect corporate governance. 
This hypothesis predicts that managers of well-established firms will be eager 
to issue convertibles with a view to extending their opportunity to enjoy perqui- 
sites, and that  they will  increase the volume of convertible issues when  the 
market holds strong expectations of a rise in their firms’ stock prices. In the 
latter half of section 6.3, we investigate statistically whether these predictions 
were actually observable during the late 1980s in Japan on the basis of compa- 
nies’ financial data. We summarize our discussion in section 6.4. 
6.2  Liberalization of Japan’s Corporate Bond Markets 
In this section, we discuss the process of liberalization in corporate bond 
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rules regarding eligibility were imposed on firms that wanted to issue bonds in 
the domestic market. Then, we discuss how the restrictive eligibility require- 
ments have been relaxed in response to a “hollowing”  of domestic corporate 
bond markets. 
6.2.1 
It is well known that during the post-World  War I1 years, and particularly 
during the  1950s and 1960s, Japanese corporations depended heavily on bor- 
rowing from banks, as table 6.1 suggests. In contrast, bond finance was rela- 
tively more important for Japanese corporations in the 1920s and  1930s. Ac- 
cording to Net Supply of Industrial Funds data prepared by the Bank of Japan 
(BOJ), even in 1931 bonds provided 21.7 percent of external corporate funding 
and bank loans only 15.2 percent. 
But in  1933, when Japan’s financial system was suffering from serious tur- 
moil caused by international financial disorder, with the support of the Minis- 
try of Finance (MOF) and the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ), around 30 of the 
largest private bond-underwriting companies and banks established the Kisai 
Kondan Kai, or the Bond Issue Arrangement Committee (BIAC), in order to 
restore stability and soundness to the securities markets. At the heart of the 
BIAC were eight private banks, headed by the IBJ. Therefore, the interests of 
private  banks, particularly  big banks, were reflected  in the workings  of  the 
BIAC. For example, the banks succeeded in structuring BIAC regulations so 
that only “trustee banks” were allowed to manage relevant collateral until the 
maturity of a bond, in return for a fee. Thus, although securities companies 
participated as underwriting members of the BIAC, only banks could earn the 
collateral fee. It should also be noted that the BIAC was a semipublic organiza- 
tion in which the MOF could exert strong influence on specific processes of 
decision making. We can safely say that the MOF regulated Japanese corporate 
bond markets through the BIAC in tight collaboration with big private banks.5 
Precisely, the BIAC was in charge of controlling the straight bond market. 
The markets of “equity-related bonds,” such as convertible bonds, were con- 
trolled, not by the BIAC, but by another organization consisting only of under- 
writing securities companies. However, this organization, like the BIAC, was 
closely monitored by the MOF, and therefore, its way of controlling convertible 
bond  issues was quite similar to the BIAC approach to straight bonds. For 
example, the principle of collateral, which will be explained in the following, 
The Process of Controlling Corporate Bond Issues 
5. The BIAC group met monthly throughout the high-growth period to determine the volume 
of new private sector debt issues, the firms that would be permitted to issue, and the specific terms 
of each issue. During the forced “low interest rate” period from about 1955 to 1970, the IBJ was 
in  a most strategic position, given its status as the only permanent,  nonrotating private sector 
member of the BIAC. But, as Calder (1993) describes in great detail, the IBJ’s role was not “top- 
down” allocation but more mediation. The convention of the BIAC was to react to specific requests 
to issue rather than to formulate general guidelines; the IBJ organized a case-by-case consensus 
on these requests by private firms. 172  Akiyoshi Horiuchi 
was applied not only to straight bond issues but also to convertible issues, and 
the eligibility requirements for convertibles were determined and adjusted in 
parallel with those for straight bonds. We will also explain the eligibility re- 
quirements for corporate bond issues in detail below. 
One of the most important roles of the BIAC was to establish the principle 
of  collateral, which prohibited Japanese firms from issuing corporate bonds 
without sufficient collateral, usually in the form of real estate or specified gov- 
ernment bonds. The organization that controlled convertible bond issues fol- 
lowed the BIAC and adopted this principle as well. The principle of collateral 
persisted until 1979 when Sears Roebuck Tokyo issued uncollateralized bonds. 
Collateral requirements urged by the powerful private banks after the panic of 
1927 thus played a crucial role in destroying the Japanese corporate bond mar- 
ket; by  the late  1930s corporations  issued  virtually  no bonds  at  all. Equity 
continued, however, to be a major  source of corporate finance, constituting 
over half of corporate funding every year from 1934 through the onset of the 
Sino-Japanese War in  1937 (table 6.2). It was the sudden expansion of heavy 
industrial investment demand under the pressure of war with China, and the 
onset of patriotic  savings drives  by  the banks to provide funds to meet this 
demand, coupled with the uncertainties a wartime environment created for cap- 
ital markets, that led to the decline of equity and to heavy corporate reliance 
on debt. 
In spite of radical  structural change in the Japanese economy immediately 
after World War 11,  the dominant position of  the banking sector in corporate 
finance was kept intact. Article 65 of the Securities Exchange Act, which was 
instituted in April 1948 following the U.S. Glass-Steagall Act, precluded banks 
from underwriting bonds for public placement, but it did uphold the principle 
of collateral for all corporate  bond  issues. Unlike the  U.S.  banks,  Japanese 
banks  were not prohibited from being shareholders of  their client firms, al- 
though the Anti-Trust Law specifies the maximum proportion  of each firms’s 
shares that banks are allowed to hold.6 Thus, Article 65 of the Securities Ex- 
change Act did not decrease the dominance of the banking sector in postwar 
Japan’s financial system. The BIAC, the long-term credit banks, and the exten- 
sive legal controls introduced in mobilizing the Japanese financial system for 
World War I1 also survived, creating a debt-oriented, bank-dominated financial 
system  with  a strong bias  toward  the  status quo. Since the  banking  sector, 
which  had  a vested  interest in  preserving  the  overwhelming importance  of 
bank loans in the financial system, was so influential in arranging corporate 
bond issues, it is hardly surprising that corporate bond markets were prevented 
from fully developing in postwar Japan.’ 
6.  At present, this maximum proportion is 5 percent. Banks can be among the largest sharehold- 
ers of  large Japanese companies by holding just a few percent of their shares. 
7. During the high-growth period, the underdeveloped nature of corporate bond markets did not 
seem an obstacle to rapid  industrial  development. The intimate relationship developed between 173  An Evaluation of Japanese Financial Liberalization 
Table 6.2  Composition of Industrial Funds (average %) 
Period  Stocks  Bonds  Loansa  Total 
I93 1-40  49.1  6.9  44.0 (43.3)  100.0 
I94 1-50  13.3  3.7  83.  I (72.5)  100.0 
I95 1-60  14.2  4.4  81.4 (72.7)  100.0 
1961-70  9.4  3.5  87.1 (78.9)  100.0 
1971-75  5.7  3.9  90.4 (81.7)  100.0 
1976-80  7.  I  4.3  88.7 (75.2)  100.0 
198 1-85  7.7  3.5  88.8 (80.4)  100.0 
~~ 
Source: Economic Srutistics Annual (Tokyo: BOJ, various years). The BOJ stopped publishing this 
data in 1986. 
Note: This table covers the net supply of external funds to all industrial firms in Japan and, there- 
fore, does not show very clearly the structural changes that have occurred in major company fi- 
nancing since the mid-1970s (cf. table 6.1). 
."umbers  in parentheses are component ratios of loans from private financial institutions 
6.2.2  Eligibility Requirements for Corporate Bond Issues 
Credit allocation through domestic corporate bond markets was based on 
both  the principle of collateral and eligibility requirements for bond issues. 
The eligibility  requirements  were  basically  requirements  for sufficient  net 
worth (book value), amount of  dividend per share, profit rates (both per share 
and as a ratio to total capital), and equity-capital ratio (ratio of equity to total 
assets). Unless they  were able to satisfy these requirements,  firms were not 
allowed to issue bonds at all. Table 6.3 shows an example of the eligibility 
requirements for convertible bond issues with collateral as of May 1985.  These 
specific requirements were less severe than those in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
and as will be explained in the following section, they were substantially re- 
laxed during the second half of the 1980s. 
Moreover, the eligibility requirements  for bond issuing effectively worked 
to crowd out small and medium-size  firms from corporate bond markets, as 
such firms did not possess sufficiently large net wealth. This mechanism corre- 
sponds to the collateral principle in the sense that the possibility of default was 
kept to a minimum in the bond markets. Although, this regulation may have 
been effective in stabilizing Japan's bond market, it hindered the development 
of  a  flexible price  mechanism in  the corporate bond market and,  in  turn, 
strengthened the system of indirect finance based on the banking sector. Even 
hanks and borrower firms worked sufficiently well to help industrial sectors finance their large 
investment expenditures. See, e.g.,  Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) and Prowse (1990). 
But, as this paper insists, the immature corporate bond market has become a weak point in the 
mechanism of corporate governance since the banking sector has lost its dominance in the finan- 
cial system. 174  Akiyoshi Horiuchi 
Table 6.3  Example of Eligibility Requirements for Issuing Convertible Bonds 
(as  of May 1985) 
A. The book value of net wealth must be more than Y1O.O billion. 
B. The amount of dividend must be no less than Y5.0 per share. 
C. The after-tax profit per share must be either no less than Y7.0 or the current profit must be 
positive immediately before the year and the after-tax profit per share must be expected to be no 
less than Y7.00 in the coming year. 
D. The value of net wealth must be more than 1.2 times as much as equity capital. 
E. The equity capital ratio must be more than  15 percent. 
F.  The profit rate per total capital must be more than 4  percent. 
Source: Koshasai  Yoran (Handbook of  Japanese  Bonds)  (Tokyo:  Nomura  Research  Institute, 
Note: A  firm had  to  satisfy A, B, and  C and more than one among D, E, and F before being 
permitted to issue convertible bonds with collateral. The eligibility requirements for issuing con- 
vertible bonds without collateral were much stricter. For example, firms with less thanY33.0 billion 
net wealth were not permitted to issue convertibles without collateral at all as of  1985. 
1987), 428-30. 
after  1988, when a rating system was introduced for determining eligibility 
requirements, the system appears to have been utilized as a means of excluding 
firms with a low rating from the bond markets.* 
6.2.3  Internationalization and Pressures from Abroad 
The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (FEFTCL) of  1948 
and the Foreign Investment Law of  1950 prohibited in principle all foreign 
exchange transactions unless specifically permitted by the government. These 
laws conferred on regulatory authorities great discretion in mediating between 
the domestic financial system and its global environment and provided the ba- 
sic legislative framework that governed foreign exchange transactions for more 
than a generation, until December 1980. 
The December 1980 revisions of the long-standing FEFTCL did not initiate 
or result in any categorical relaxation of Japanese foreign exchange controls. 
Other incremental  steps had been taken previously. Furthermore,  important 
provisions for exchange controls to be invoked in times of financial crisis re- 
mained even after the revised FEFTCL came into effect (MOF 1993, 139). But 
the de facto removal of controls during normal times helped ratify and acceler- 
ate the historical movement of Japanese corporate finance away from the reli- 
ance on domestic bank loans that had been the essence of the indirect financing 
mechanisms of the high-growth period. 
Most  important,  the erosion of  exchange controls that  began  during the 
1970s and was accelerated by revision of the FEFTCL let Japanese companies 
8. In 1990 the system of eligibility requirements was radically changed in that traditional re- 
quirements such as minimum net wealth were all abolished and instead a system of  rating was 
introduced. Specifically, firms with  rating BBB can issue straight bonds for public placement. 
Those with a rating higher than A can issue straight bonds without collateral. 175  An Evaluation of Japanese Financial Liberalization 
issue straight and convertible bonds overseas, particularly in the Euromarkets. 
There, the  absence of collateral requirements  and mandatory prospectus is- 
sues, together with the broad range of financial instruments, swaps, and ex- 
change rate hedging mechanisms not available in Japan, made raising funds 
cheaper and often quicker and more convenient than in Japan itself. 
Starting in 1961 with Sumitomo Metals and Kawasaki Steel, Japanese cor- 
porations had periodically issued bonds abroad during the high-growth era. 
But the total amount raised was small: during the early 1970s the Euromarkets 
accounted for only 1.7 percent of Japanese corporate financing, although the 
share had risen by the late 1970s to  19.6 percent, mainly to finance offshore 
operations. In the early 1980s reliance on offshore finance began to rise even 
more sharply, primarily through large-scale corporate bond issues in the Euro- 
markets,  with  the Japanese  surge  abroad  driven  by  both  expectations  of  a 
strong yen (in the case of foreign-currency-denominated issues) and the more 
flexible issuing conditions available outside Japan. In 1979 the value of corpo- 
rate bonds issued by Japanese corporations in domestic markets totaled over 
Y2.4 trillion,  more than three times the value of offshore issues; but by  1985 
total Japanese corporate bond issues offshore had risen by Y3.3 trillion, more 
than 25 percent greater than the total for Japanese corporate issues within Ja- 
pan (table 6.4). Total Euromarket financial issues, with terms dictated by mar- 
kets rather than by bureaucratic fiat, supplied over half of all Japanese corpo- 
rate bond financing and one-third of  total corporate finance, despite the low 
cost of capital to domestic issuers within Japan. 
The higher bond  issuance fees compelled Japanese firms to  issue  bonds 
abroad in the 1980s, and the de facto buyers of the bonds were mostly Japanese 
investors, thereby giving rise to a “hollowing” of domestic corporate bond mar- 
kets. The MOF has tried to prevent this hollowing by regulating Japanese in- 
vestors’ purchase of  Eurobonds issued by  Japanese firms. Specifically, Japa- 
nese investors are forbidden to buy such corporate bonds within three months 
of the bonds’ issuance. But this regulation seems to have been ineffective be- 
cause underwriting  securities companies  in  London could circumvent it by 
selling the Eurobonds issued by Japanese firms to Japanese investors by sub- 
scription. This subscription system has helped the underwriters to minimize 
the cost of  mediation between Japanese firms and Japanese investors in the 
Eurobond markets. 
Offshore financing by Japanese corporations exerted pressure to relax issu- 
ing restrictions, especially collateral requirements (which incidentally did not 
exist in many of the Euromarkets where Japanese firms were active in raising 
funds).  Banks  had  long opposed  any  relaxation  of  collateral  requirements 
within the domestic bond market because the stringent rules had allowed them 
to reap considerable fee income and, more important, had prevented the full- 
scale development of financing methods substitutable for bank loans. The exis- 
tence of these fees caused the total bond-issuing cost in the domestic market 176  Akiyoshi Horiuchi 
Table 6.4  “Hollowing” of the Domestic Corporate Bond Market (billion yen) 
Amount of Corporate Bonds Issued by 
Japanese Firms 
BIA 
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Source: Monthly Report of  Jupunese Bonds (Tokyo: Association of Securities Underwriters, vari- 
ous issues). 
Note: Corporate bonds include straight, convertible, and warrant bonds. 
to be significantly higher than in Eurornarket~.~  Japanese banks began to reas- 
sess this situation during the mid-l980s, as the rush offshore cut back their 
share of corporate financial business.’O 
The MOF took important steps toward market orientation in the regulation 
of corporate bond issues, which made the control-minded policies of the BIAC 
more difficult. As we saw earlier, collateral had in principle been required for 
all Japanese corporate bond issues between 1933 and the early  1970s. In De- 
cember  1972, under the MOF’s guidance, underwriting securities companies 
and trustee banks  determined  the rules for “noncollateralized convertibles,” 
and according to this new rule Mitsubishi Trading Company issued noncollat- 
eralized convertibles in  1973 for the first time in Japan. In reality, this  1972 
rule did not imply an introduction of full-scale “noncollateralization” into con- 
9. As Takeda and Turner (1992, 77-78)  point out, bond issuance fees were significantly higher 
in the Japanese domestic market than in Euromarkets mainly because banks intervene intensively 
in bond issues in the domestic market. 
10. The hollowing of  domestic corporate bond markets does not seem to have been mitigated 
in spite of  the liberalization of domestic markets. According to table 6.4, the relative importance 
of corporate bonds issued by Japanese firms abroad has increased since 1990. The MOF reportedly 
introduced the March 1993 regulation forbidding securities companies to sell by  subscription Eu- 
robonds  issued by  Japanese  firms to  domestic  investors in  order  to  stop  the hollowing  phe- 
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Table 6.5  Process of Liberalizing Noncollateralized Convertibles: Changes in 
the Eligibility Requirement of Minimum Value of Net Wealth and 
Number of Eligible Firms 
Date 
Minimum Value of 
Net Wealth (billion Y) 
Changes in Number 
of Eligible Firms 
March 1979"  150 
January 1983  110 
April 1984  55 
July 1985  33 
February 1987  20h 
November 1988  20d 
2 
II +25 
26 -+  97 
111 +  175 
180 +  330' 
130 +  500' 
Source: Annual Report of Securities Bureau (Tokyo: MOF, various issues). 
"he  eligibility  requirements  for noncollateralized  convertible bonds  were  first  determined  in 
March 1979. 
"The rating criterion was introduced. A firm rated A or higher became eligible irrespective of 
minimum net wealth and other requirements. A firm rated BBB or higher was eligible if its net 
wealth was no less than Y55.0 billion. 
%'resented in round numbers. 
dA  firm rated BBB became eligible if its net wealth was no less thanY33.0 billion. 
vertible bond issues because issuing firms were still required to hold specific 
assets as a sort of security. 
In March 1979 Sears Roebuck became Japan's first noncollateralized convert- 
ible bond issuer, followed the next month by Matsushita Corporation and by 21 
other firms during 1979-84. This time, the bonds were truly noncollateralized. 
Although in the early 1980s the eligibility requirements for noncollateralized 
convertible issues were so strict as to permit only a few firms of recognized credi- 
bility to issue them, the requirements  were steadily relaxed during the latter 
half of the 1980s. As a result, the number of the firms eligible to issue noncol- 
lateralized convertibles greatly increased (table 6.5). This liberalization surely 
contributed to the remarkable increase in the volume of convertibles issued in 
the domestic market during the latter half of the 1980s. As  table 6.6 indicates, 
the rapid increase in convertible bond issues in the domestic market during this 
period was primarily due to the surge in noncollateralized convertibles. 
It is noteworthy, however, that  small-scale enterprises  were in  effect ex- 
cluded from the convertible bond market even in the late  1980s. The amount 
of  convertibles issued by firms listed on the over-the-counter  market,  which 
are typical of small-scale businesses, was Y84.5 billion from 1977 to 1989, just 
less than 0.3 percent of the total amount of convertibles issued in the domestic 
market during the same period. 
11. In January  1985 TDK undertook the first unsecured  straight bond issue in the domestic 
market since 1932; by  February  1987 more than 350 other firms had also been authorized to do 
so. In 1985 the MOF's Securities Exchange Council proposed the eventual abolition of the collat- 
eral rule, a change facilitating the flow of capital toward consumer- and service-oriented firms at 
the expense of by-now capital-rich heavy industry. 178  Akiyoshi Horiuchi 
Table 6.6  Convertible Bonds Issued by Japanese Firms in the Domestic Market 
(billion yen) 
With Reservation 
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Source: Koshasai Yoran (Handbook of Japanese Bonds) (Tokyo: Nomura Research Institute, vari- 
ous issues). 
Nore: Numbers in parentheses are number of  convertible bond issues. 
6.3  Convertible Bond Issues and the Structure of Corporate 
Governance 
As has been explained, the most conspicuous  structural change in Japan’s 
corporate finance during the 1980s was the surge in equity-related bond issues 
and decline in the relative importance of bank borrowing. In particular, Japa- 
nese firms actively issued convertible bonds in the late 1980s. The restrictive 
rules on bond issues managed by the BIAC and other organizations were grad- 
ually relaxed during this period, so that well-established  firms gained easier 
access to the convertible bond market. Therefore, it may seem natural for such 
firms to have increased the amount of convertibles issued during the late 1980s. 
For them the convertible bond is a close substitute for bank credit as a means 
of fund-raising. From the viewpoint of standard corporate finance theory, how- 
ever, it is difficult to explain why they preferred issuing convertibles to bank 
loans, as will be discussed later. 
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ible bonds  in the late 1980s. This hypothesis  is related  both  to a particular 
characteristic of liberalization in the corporate bond market and to the mecha- 
nism of corporate governance in Japan. As was explained  in section 6.2, an 
important characteristic of the liberalization of Japanese bond markets was the 
favorable  treatment  of  major  well-established  companies.  For  those  firms’ 
managers, convertible bond issues were not a means of overcoming the agency 
problem due to asymmetric information, but a means of increasing their per- 
quisite expenditure. This is in essence the hypothesis advocated in this paper. 
6.3.1 
The standard theory of corporate finance provides two reasons to issue con- 
vertible bonds.  In either case imperfect information  plays  an essential role. 
First, firms’ managers or shareholders would issue convertible bonds to signal 
their incentive to avoid risky projects that may entail large losses for their cred- 
itors under the rule of limited liability. Issuing convertible bonds implies that, 
even if a risky  project  goes well  and realizes  extraordinary  returns,  current 
shareholders must yield most of the returns to investors who hold convertibles. 
Thus, convertible bonds are thought to be effective in mitigating the agency 
problem  existing  between  shareholders  and creditors  (debtholders)  empha- 
sized by Jensen and Meckling (1  976). 
Second, according to Stein (1992), some firms, particularly medium-quality 
ones, have incentives to issue convertible bonds in order to obtain funding con- 
ditions different from those available to low-quality firms. High-quality firms 
with good prospects  of  returns are able to issue straight bonds or to borrow 
from banks without endangering default risk. On the other hand, low-quality 
firms with poor prospects of returns are forced to issue stock instead of straight 
bonds because the latter incurs serious default risk. As Stein (1992) shows, 
medium-quality firms with adequately good prospects may be able to differen- 
tiate themselves  from low-quality firms by issuing convertible bonds in the 
capital market. 
In either of these cases, convertible bonds are instrumental for firms who 
suffer from the agency problem caused by asymmetric information. Therefore, 
these  theories  predict  that  firms that  are newly  established  or have not  yet 
achieved excellent performance should be more active in issuing convertible 
bonds than well-established firms.’*  According to Brealey and Myers, “convert- 
ibles tend to be issued by the smaller and more speculative firms” (1991,549). 
6.3.2  Another Hypothesis 
It is doubtful whether the standard theories about convertible bonds are ap- 
plicable to the situation in Japan during the latter half of the 1980s. Although 
the eligibility requirements for convertible bonds became less and less restric- 
Standard Theory of Convertible Bond Issues 
12. Hitachi issued U.S. dollar-denominated  convertible bonds in September 1962. At that time 
Hitachi could not choose a straight bond issue because the company was not well known among 
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tive during the 1980s, only relatively large scale firms were allowed to issue 
convertibles.  Overwhelmingly important issuers of  convertibles were major 
companies  that  were  previously  established  in  the  Japanese economy. For 
them, the agency problem due to asymmetric information emphasized by  the 
standard theories seems to be irrelevant. 
It may be said that outside investors overrated stock prices of industrial firms 
during the late 1980s. If  managers and current shareholders understood  the 
overvaluation of their stock prices in the capital market, they would have been 
induced to issue shares and convertible bonds to outsiders in order to exploit 
the excess profits due to asymmetric information. Can this hypothesis of  out- 
sider overvaluation be relevant to Japan’s capital markets in the latter half of 
the 1980s? If this hypothesis were true, current shareholders (insiders) would 
reduce their equity positions as much as possible in order to press stocks over- 
rated from their viewpoint on outside investors. In reality, however, current 
shareholders did not seem to reduce their equity positions. In particular, in the 
late  1980s, Japanese firms did not reduce the share of internal funds in the 
total amount of fund-rai~ing.’~  It would be irrational for current shareholders 
to increase the amount of retained profits when outsiders overrate their firms’ 
stock value because it means missing a chance to take excess profits by issuing 
convertibles and stocks to ignorant outside investors. Thus, the relatively high 
importance of internal funds in Japanese corporate finance in the late  1980s 
weakens the hypothesis of outsider overvaluation. 
Why then were big Japanese companies so eager to issue convertible bonds 
in the late 1980s? Managers of those firms reportedly explained that convert- 
ibles were preferable to bank loans and other means of raising funds because 
convertibles could be issued at extremely low coupon rates when investors had 
strong bullish expectations about the firms’ stock prices.  l4  But this explanation 
is not convincing from the viewpoint of shareholders of those firms because 
low coupon rates on convertibles imply a high probability  that shareholders 
will be forced in the near future to yield some valuable shares in their firms to 
bond investors. Extraordinarily bullish expectations, such as those observed in 
the stock market during the latter half  of the  1980s, would not necessarily 
induce firms to issue convertibles if their concern was purely that of maximiz- 
ing profits on behalf of their current shareholders. 
If managers are not sufficiently constrained by the principle of maximizing 
shareholder profits, however, incentives may exist for them to issue convertible 
bonds and reduce borrowing from banks. In particular, bullish expectations 
13. The importance of internal funds (i.e., depreciation and retained profits) was very low during 
the high-growth period in Japan. The proportion of internal funds in the total amount of funds 
raised by major companies was 30.2 and 42.4 percent in the 1960s and 1970s. respectively. How- 
ever, internal funds have relatively increased since the early 1970s. From 1980 to 1984, the average 
proportion of internal funds was 56.4 percent. From 1985 to 1989, the proportion did not signifi- 
cantly decrease, remaining at 53.6 percent (BOJ, various issues). 
14. E.g., it was widely known that many Japanese firms could issue convertible bonds in Swit- 
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of stock prices may  more strongly induce corporate managers to issue more 
convertibles  than  otherwise. We  explain this by  introducing a simple two- 
period model. 
6.3.3  A Simple Model 
We  assume here that there is no problem of  asymmetric information be- 
tween insiders and outside investors of the sort considered, for example, by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Stein (1992). Therefore, if they are perfectly 
disciplined to maximize current shareholder profits, incumbent managers have 
no particular reason to prefer issuing convertibles to borrowing from banks. 
Furthermore, managers are assumed to be constrained by the extremely high 
penalty of bankruptcy. In other words, it is assumed that they want to avoid 
default at any expense because in bankruptcy they incur huge pecuniary and 
psychological costs. The assumptions both of no asymmetric information and 
of the constraints of bankruptcy costs on managers are plausible in the case of 
Japan’s well-established firms. The managers of those companies have accumu- 
lated intangible assets embodied in themselves whose value will be totally lost 
should their firms go bankrupt. 
A firm is assumed to have an investment opportunity with positive net pres- 
ent value. The amount of  external funds that must be raised to proceed with 
this  investment  opportunity  is denoted  I. When  this  investment  is  carried 
out, the value of the firm will in the next period be X, with probability P, and 
XL(X, >  X,) with probability  1 -  P. We assume that the managers of the firm 
can enjoy a perquisite or a “pet” investment represented by Z in addition to the 
normal investment I. The managers raise I + 2  either by borrowing from banks 
or by issuing convertible bonds. For simplicity, we assume that all agents are 
risk-neutral and the equilibrium interest rate is zero.” 
The case of borrowingfrom banks. When the firm borrows from a bank, the 
maximum amount of funds will be denoted X, because of the assumption of 
prohibitive bankruptcy costs. Thus, 
(1)  1 + ZSX,. 
The present value of the firm’s stock V is given by the following equation: 
v=  P(X, -  I-  z) + (1 -  P)  (X, -I -  2) 
= PX, + (1 -  P)XL -  I - z 
= v, -  z, 
15. In practice, it is difficult to identify perquisite  expenditure by incumbent managers. But, 
e.g.,  we may regard various investment expenditures in order to preserve and/or increase job op- 
portunities for present employees as typical perquisite expenditure. Many Japanese firms engaged 
in financial investment called zai-rech during the late 1980s.  Those financial activities may also be 
perquisites because they were associated with an undue increase in the risk from the viewpoint 
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where V,  is the firm’s share value when the managers do not take any perquisite 
at all. We assume an efficient capital market here, so that managers’ expendi- 
ture on perquisite Z leads to a decline in the firm’s value  I.i 
The case of issuing convertible bonds. To raise funds I + Z, the firm could issue 
convertible bonds whose total face value is F: The bonds will be converted into 
lOOC percent of the firm’s shares in the future when its stock value turns out 
to be X,. But when the stock value is X, in the second period, they will not be 
converted into shares, so that the managers will have to repay F to bondholders. 
The constraint of bankruptcy costs assumed above requires that F be no larger 
than X,;  that is, 
FSX,. 
The present value of the convertible bond I + Z is 
I+Z=PCX,+(l  +P)F 
Therefore, the maximum amount of I + Z is given by the following condition: 
I  + z S PCX, + (1 -  P)X, 
= x, + P(CX, -  X,)  . 
As theoretical consistency requires CX, >  X,,  the maximum  value of I  + Z 
can be larger than X, when the firm issues convertibles. The assumption of an 
efficient capital market ensures that the present  stock value of the firm  V is 
equal to V, -  Z. 
If the firm is allowed to freely change the conversion ratio C,  it can increase 
the maximum amount of perquisite expenditure Z by offering a higher ratio C 
to investors.  But the present rules governing the issuing of convertibles pre- 
vents managers from manipulating C in Japan. Under the present institutional 
framework, we can assume this conversion ratio to be exogenously given.16 
By comparing inequalities  (1)  and (2),  we can see that the managers  can 
increase the amount expended on the “pet” investment Z by  issuing convert- 
ibles. An increase in Z will lead to capital loss for the firm’s current sharehold- 
ers. Therefore, if shareholders are able to instill sufficient discipline in manag- 
ers  so  as  to  maintain  profit  maximization  as their  only  goal,  there  is  no 
16. The ratio C is equal to the face value F of  the convertible bond divided by  the conversion 
price. In Japan the conversion price is determined by 
(1 + S) X (the standardized stock price) X (the number of stock shares), 
where S  is institutionally determined by self-regulation among securities companies. The standard- 
ized stock price of an issuing firm is determined as an average of the firm’s stock price over several 
days immediately before the issuing data. Thus, the conversion ratio C given by  the following 
formula can be regarded as a constant: 
C = F/[(  1  + S) X (the standardized stock price) X (the number of stock shares)]. 183  An Evaluation of Japanese Financial Liberalization 
particular incentive for managers to issue convertibles. If incumbent managers 
are to some extent free from the discipline of maximizing shareholder profits, 
however, they have incentives to increase expenditure Z by issuing convertibles 
at the expense of present shareholders. In this primitive model, investors’ bull- 
ish expectations are presented by a higher value of either P or X,. Thus, equa- 
tion (2)  shows that when investors have more bullish expectations of the firm’s 
value, as during the late 1980s, managers’ incentives to issue convertibles be- 
come stronger, other things being constant. 
Our model assumes imperfect corporate governance in Japan in the sense 
that corporate managers have latitude more or less to direct firms’ resources to 
satisfy their own (and probably employees’) preference for perquisite expendi- 
ture. On the basis of this assumption, we can explain the surge in convertibles 
issues during the latter half of the 1980s. The liberalization of  the convertible 
bond market that started in the early  1980s weakened  the severity of bank- 
ruptcy constraints for corporate managers and thereby increased their perqui- 
site expenditure. The sharp rise in stock prices during the second half of the 
1980s produced optimistic expectations of future stock prices, which helped 
managers expand the latitude of perquisite investment as equation (2)  suggests. 
In contrast, since 1990, when pessimistic expectations began to prevail in the 
stock market, Japanese firms have lost their enthusiasm for issuing convert- 
ibles. The amount of convertible bond issues has substantially decreased since 
1990 as figure 6.2 shows.” 
6.3.4  Evidence Supporting the Hypothesis 
We can derive two propositions from our hypothesis of imperfect corporate 
governance. The first proposition is that the active issuance of  convertibles by 
a firm tends to increase  its perquisite expenditure,  thereby  deteriorating the 
firms’ performance from the shareholders’ viewpoint. The second is that the 
more optimistic the stock market is, the more strongly stimulated managers 
are to issue convertibles to increase perquisite expenditure. In the following, 
we consider whether statistical evidence supports these propositions. 
Responses of  stock prices to convertible bond issues. The most straightforward 
statistical test of the first proposition is to examine the responses of individual 
firms’ stock prices to issues of  convertible bonds. This is an event study. Ac- 
cording to our hypothesis of imperfect corporate governance, issuing convert- 
ible bonds signals to the stock market the managers’ intent to increase perqui- 
site expenditure.  Thus, provided that the stock market is efficient, the stock 
price would  respond  negatively  to the announcement  of  a convertible bond 
17. As  was explained in section 6.2, the eligibility requirements for domestic convertible bond 
issues have been substantially eased since the late 1980s. This mitigation has extended opportuni- 
ties for small-scale businesses to issue convertible bonds. Thus, the number of firms listed on the 
over-the-counter market that issued convertibles increased in the early 1990s. 184  Akiyoshi Horiuchi 
issue. On the other hand, under the standard theory of corporate finance, issu- 
ing convertibles is good news for outside investors, who suffer from imperfect 
information about corporate management. Therefore, stock prices would re- 
spond positively to the announcement of a convertible bond issue. 
We test the response of stock prices to issues of convertible bonds in Japan’s 
domestic market from 1985 to 1991. Specifically, we examine changes in the 
rate of  return  on shares in issuing firms compared  with the  average rate of 
return on shares in their peer firms. If an issue of convertibles is bad news for 
outside investors, the announcement of  such an issue will decrease the stock 
price and thereby reduce its rate of return. 
It is essential for our test to identify when  news of a convertible issue is 
made public by an issuing firm. When the managers of a firm want to issue a 
convertible bond, they must submit an application to an underwriting securities 
company at least four months  before the  scheduled date of  the bond  issue. 
The underwriter introduces the application to the regular meeting organized 
by  major underwriters to examine the feasibility of the proposed issue. After 
the regular meeting has decided that the proposed issue is feasible, the firm’s 
board of directors officially determines to issue convertibles with specific issu- 
ing conditions and releases the decision to the press. At the same time, the firm 
is required to submit a securities registration statement to the MOF following 
the stipulation of the Securities Exchange Act. 
Although the length of the time lag between the press release and the day 
when the bonds are actually issued varies from case to case, it is usually several 
weeks. We can identify the precise date of announcement of individual issues 
by consulting newspapers. We select convertible bond issues announced to the 
press from January to December  1988, when Japanese firms most actively is- 
sued convertibles. The number of  sample firms thus collected is a little less 
than 300. We  had to exclude from our sample firms not listed on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange because the data on holding period return on their stocks are 
not available to us. The total number of sample firms is 262: 188 cases issuing 
in the domestic market and 74 issuing in foreign markets. 
If an issue of convertibles is bad (good) news for investors, the press release 
of the plan to issue bonds will decrease (increase) the firm’s stock price imme- 
diately, and the holding period rate of return on the stock will be lower (higher) 
than those of peer firms during the specific month. The holding period rate of 
return R,(r)  of firm i in the month r when the firm announces the plan of issuing 
convertibles  and the industrial average of holding period return R,(t) can be 
obtained from the Japan Securities Research Institute. Table 6.7 summarizes 
the average C,[R,(t)  -  R,(t)]/n  of estimated responses in holding period return 
on issuing firms’ stocks, where n  is the size of  the sample. Our concern is 
whether the average is significantly  negative  as the hypothesis of imperfect 
corporate governance predicts.  If  this hypothesis is true, the holding period 
returns on issuing firms’ stocks are on average lower than the industrial aver- 
ages over the three months preceding their issues of convertibles. 
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Table 6.7  Relative Rate of Return on Stock When a Firm Decides to Issue 
Convertible Bonds Compared with Industrial Average, January to 
December 1988 (%) 
Number of Firms  Average  Standard Errors 
Domestic issues  188  0.24  0.48 
Foreign issues  74  -0.88  0.81 
Total  262  -0.07  0.41 
Sources: Koshasui  Yorun (Handbook of  Japanese Bonds) (Tokyo:  Nomura Research Institute, 
1989);  Kubushiki-roshi Shuekiriru (Rates of Return on Common Stocks) (Tokyo: Japan Securities 
Research Institute, 1990). 
Nore: The basic data are holding period returns (from the end of the previous month to the end of 
the current month) on stock, when issuing firms announced their issuing plans, minus the average 
of industries’ holding period return. The sample consists of all firms  that announced a plan to issue 
convertibles from January to December  1988. Our sample excludes those firms not listed on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange, because data on their holding period returns were not available in our data 
source. There were some cases in which a firm issued a few convertible bonds on the same day to 
raise a large amount of funds. In this table, we do not treat the multiple issues separately. There- 
fore, the number of  issuing firms in this table is smaller than the number of  issues recorded in 
table 6.6. 
holding period returns is slightly negative compared with the industrial aver- 
age. But it is not statistically significant at all. In the case of foreign issues, the 
stock prices  seem to show  a  slightly  stronger negative  response  to the  an- 
nouncement. But it is not significant either. 
Therefore, our event study does not give clear-cut support to the hypothesis 
of  imperfect corporate governance.  The standard  hypothesis  of  convertible 
bond issues, which expects a positive response of stock prices to the announce- 
ment, is not supported either. However, we need to mention a caveat. The valid- 
ity of our event study depends crucially on the presumption that the stock mar- 
ket is efficient in Japan. This presumption  is problematic.  We  have not yet 
reached  any unambiguous conclusion  concerning the efficiency of the Japa- 
nese stock market (see, e.g., Hoshi 1987). However, in my understanding, there 
is a lot of casual evidence that casts doubt on the validity of the efficiency 
hypothesis in Japan. Therefore, we should refrain from deriving a definite con- 
clusion based on the event study summarized in table 6.7. 
Projitability after convertible bond issues and the influence of  stock price in- 
creases on convertible bond issues. In the following, we examine the relevancy 
of the hypothesis of imperfect corporate governance by using statistical meth- 
ods alternative to the event study we explained above. Specifically, on the basis 
of panel data from the mid-1980s to early 1990s, we test whether the firms 
that issued convertible bonds systematically experienced deterioration of their 
profit rates after the issue, compared with peer firms in the same industries. 
The sample is 509 Japanese firms. They are major firms,  and until  the late 
1980s they had been eligible to issue convertibles without collateral. In other 
words, they had been given the widest range of options in their fund-raising 186  Akiyoshi Horiuchi 
until the late 1980s. The dependent variable, PRG(t), is the profit rate of each 
firm compared with the average profit rate of peer firms belonging to the same 
industry. Independent variables  are the lagged profit rate compared with the 
industrial average, PRG(t-  l),  and the amount of convertibles issued each year 
divided by total assets with suitable lags, CB(t-i)  for i = 1, . . . ,4.  The sample 
period is the seven years from 1985 to 1991. 
The result of the panel-data estimation is summarized in table 6.8. The result 
clearly shows that an increase in convertible issues significantly decreased the 
profit rate of issuing firms with two or three years' lag. This suggests that man- 
agers of  major companies tend to issue convertibles  in order to pursue their 
own objectives  rather  than  profit  maximization  on behalf  of  current  share- 
holders. 
The second proposition  derived from our model is that an increase in ex- 
pected stock prices will induce incumbent managers to issue convertibles be- 
cause it mitigates the constraint of  bankruptcy for them. We examine whether 
this prediction was true during the late 1980s. We choose the amount of con- 
vertibles  issued  each  year  divided  by  total  assets  as a  dependent  variable 
(CB(t)). Independent  variables  are lagged variables CB(t-  1) and CB(t-2), 
lagged stock prices ST(t-  1) and ST(t-2),  and lagged profit rates PR(t-  1) and 
PR(t-2).  We introduce lagged variables CB(t-  1) and CB(t-2)  because rules 
concerning convertible issues in Japan have greatly influenced the pattern of 
issuing behavior of individual firms.'* The lagged stock prices are introduced 
on the assumption that they essentially determine investor expectations of the 
stock prices. We  are particularly  interested  in the  statistical significance  of 
these lagged stock prices in the following investigation. We choose the Tobit 
model to test the proposition because the frequency with which the dependent 
variable CB(t) takes the value zero is rather high-nearly  80 percent of depen- 
dent variable values are zero. The estimated result is summarized in table 6.9. 
The result  shows  that  higher  stock  prices  induced  firms  to  issue  larger 
amounts of convertible bonds in the following year. Since we may suppose that 
an increase in  stock prices positively  influences  the market expectations  of 
stock prices, the result suggests that the higher level of expected prices stimu- 
lated convertible issues during the late 1980s. The result in table 6.9 thus sup- 
ports our hypothesis that bullish expectations in the stock market will induce 
corporate managers to issue convertible  bonds. This suggests  that corporate 
governance has been inefficient in Japan from the viewpoint of shareholders. 
6.3.5  A Discussion 
We  can summarize our investigation  concerning the relationship between 
the surge of convertible bond issues and liberalization in the bond market dur- 
18. Since  1973, the self-regulatory rule determined by  the group of  underwriting securities 
companies has restricted the length of  intervals between issues of convertibles so that firms are in 
effect required to take an interval of  at least one year to reissue convertibles. 187  An Evaluation of Japanese Financial Liberalization 
Table 6.8  Profit Rates and Convertible Bond Issues, 1985-91 (panel-data 
estimation; random-effects method) 
Variable  Estimation 
PRG (t- 1) 






Mean of dependent variable 
Sum of  squared residuals 
Standard error of  regression 
Adjusted R2 
0.60100 (50.19) 
-0.00379  (-0.49) 
-0.01362  (-1.81) 
-0.03833  (-4.79) 
-0.03616  (-4.16) 






Source: NIKKEI NEEDS.  TS. COMPANY (Tokyo: Nihon Kezai Shimbun, Division of  Datebank, 
1994). 
Nores:  Dependent variable is PRG(t) = the operating profit rate (per total assets) of each firm 
minus the average profit rate of the industry. CB(t) = the amount of convertible bonds issued by 
each firm  divided by total assets. Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
Table 6.9  Stock Prices and Convertible Bond Issues, 1985-91 (Tobit estimation) 




ST(t  -2) 
PR(t-  I) 
PR(t-2) 
ST(t-1) 
-0.19034  (- 15.73) 





-0.48500  (-2.05) 
Log of likelihood function  -735.923 
Percent of positive observations  0.20236 
Source: NIKKEI NEEDS. TS. COMPANY (Tokyo: Nihon Kezai Shimbun, Division of Datebank, 
1994). 
Notes:  Dependent variable is CB(t). ST(t) = stock price at end of year t,  standardized by  setting 
stock prices at 1991 year-end to 100.0. PR(r) = profit rate per total assets in year t. Numbers in 
parentheses are t-values. 
ing the 1980s in Japan. The liberalization stimulated Japanese firms to issue a 
large amount of  convertible bonds, thereby reducing their reliance on bank 
loans. Although this impact of liberalization in the bond market seems remark- 
able, it is doubtful whether the impact was genuinely productive. Convertible 
bonds and other equity-related bonds, such as warrant bonds, are instrumental 
for firms facing serious agency problems because they have just started busi- 
ness or because they have not yet achieved excellent performance and more 
important because they do not enjoy favorable treatment resulting from a long- 188  Akiyoshi Horiuchi 
term relationship with their main banks. In theory, such bonds would not be so 
attractive for firms that have established themselves in the Japanese economy 
because they are not confronted with agency problems caused by asymmetric 
information. 
The liberalization in the Japanese corporate bond market has allowed more 
and more firms to utilize convertibles and warrants as a means of fund-raising. 
But the eligibility requirements confined the possible use of those instruments 
to relatively large scale and well-established  firms during the 1980s. The re- 
quirement  excluded  from the  corporate bond  market those  firms  that  most 
needed the instruments. For example, firms registered on the over-the-counter 
market, most of  which were promising  small and medium-sized companies, 
are not allowed to issue warrants at all and find stricter constraints imposed on 
them when issuing convertibles, compared to well-established firms. 
It should be noted that these small-scale firms have rarely participated in the 
traditional main bank relationships that are supposed to weaken pressure from 
capital markets on  incumbent managers. Managers of small firms cannot af- 
ford to abuse the freedom of issuing convertible bonds for the purpose of in- 
creasing perquisite expenditure instead of reducing agency costs as suggested 
by the standard theory 
Therefore, the liberalization in corporate bond markets brought forth only 
superficial consequences in the  1980s. Most managers in Japan’s big compa- 
nies enthusiastically welcomed the liberalization because it widened the possi- 
bility of increasing their perquisite expenditure by mitigating the constraint of 
bankruptcy.  Our statistical examination  confirms  that  the surge in issues of 
convertibles tended to be associated with increases in perquisite expenditure 
during the latter half of the 1980s in Japan. 
We may conclude that financial liberalization in Japan’s corporate bond mar- 
kets has been conducted in a distorted manner. The process indicates how timid 
or distrustful the related parties, including the monetary authorities, are about 
the  productivity  of  the full-scale  corporate bond market  mechanism.  They 
should acknowledge that the firms with a significant possibility of default can 
be efficiently treated in the market. In other words, corporate bond markets do 
not play a meaningful role when only blue-chip firms without any risk of de- 
fault are permitted to issue various instruments. There remain serious obstacles 
for small-scale  and venture businesses  in Japanese corporate bond markets. 
The surge of convertible issues in the late 1980s and the subsequent deteriorat- 
ing performance of issuing companies in the early 1990s suggest the remaining 
weakness of Japanese capital markets. 
6.4  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we investigated the process of liberalization in Japanese bond 
markets during the 1980s and its consequences in the late 1980s. The domestic 
bond market has been greatly liberalized since the early 1980s, mainly because 189  An Evaluation of Japanese Financial Liberalization 
of pressure from abroad associated with internationalization of financial mar- 
kets. But the process of liberalization was distorted and imperfect in the sense 
that only well-established firms were permitted wide opportunities in choosing 
various bonds as a means of fund-raising, and small-sized and relatively newly 
established firms were not allowed access to such instruments. In theory, firms 
of  the  latter type  would  have had  genuine  need  for convertibles  and other 
equity-related bonds. The consequence of the distorted liberalization was an 
increase in perquisite expenditure by well-established firms because convert- 
ible bonds mitigated the constraint of bankruptcy they had confronted during 
the high-growth era. 
This paper provides two lessons. First, Japan should more boldly accept the 
market-oriented consequences of financial liberalization. Many Japanese, par- 
ticularly  the Japanese monetary authorities, are still skeptical about the effi- 
ciency of market mechanisms in the financial system and have an irresolute 
attitude toward full-scale liberalization. There appears to be a somewhat self- 
congratulatory attitude in their belief that their “careful” and conservative pol- 
icy of  liberalizing the financial system in Japan (“gradualism” in this paper) 
has contributed to stability in spite of drastic structural changes since the mid- 
1970s. We should, however, pay enough attention  to the negative effects of 
their conservative policy, such as those we have emphasized in this paper. 
Second, the present situation of corporate governance in Japan deserves fur- 
ther careful investigation.  In this paper we discussed the possibility  that the 
nature of  governance,  which is imperfect from the shareholders’ viewpoint, 
resulted  in  inefficient  expenditure  by  corporations  in  the  late  1980s. Many 
people might claim that the present structure of corporate governance actually 
stimulated  rapid  industrial  development  in  the  Japanese  economy.  Mutual 
shareholding  among major corporations has protected  incumbent managers 
from capital market pressures, thereby promoting managerial decision making 
from a long-term perspective. At the same time, the main bank relationship 
between  banks and borrower firms is regarded as efficiently monitoring and 
disciplining  managers  to  pursue  efficient  management,  in  place  of  capital 
markets.  l9 
However, our recent experience indicates that we have not yet established 
the perfect structure of corporate governance in Japan. During the high-growth 
era, the primary objective of corporate managers was to exploit the abundant 
opportunities of rapid growth. The Japanese corporate structure, which give 
19. See, e.g., Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard (1994).  There are some empirical studies which support 
the  hypothesis  that  Japanese  corporate  governance  led  to  efficient  management,  particularly 
through the monitoring  and disciplining  provided  by  the main bank  relationship.  See Hoshi, 
Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990a, 1990b, 1991), Lichtenberg and Pushner (1992), Morck and Na- 
kamura (1992), and Prowse (1990).  Most of their analyses are confined to the period up to the late 
1980s. If they had considered the structural changes in Japanese industry from the late 1980s to 
the early  1990s, they might have obtained more pessimistic results on the efficiency of current 
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wide discretionary power to incumbent managers and current employees, did 
not lead to serious losses for the other stakeholders mainly because the rapid 
growth of corporations covered up potential conflicts of interest between dif- 
ferent stakeholders.  When an industry  is confronted  with  severe structural 
changes, however, the Japanese way of  promoting  wide discretion of  incum- 
bent managers and employees may have the weakness of delaying the restruc- 
turing of corporations. As Boot (1992) exemplifies, insiders of  corporations 
tend to resist fundamental  structural changes in order to preserve their own 
vested interests. 
Full-scale financial liberalization is expected to strengthen the capital mar- 
ket monitoring of corporate management, thereby building an efficient mecha- 
nism of corporate finance in Japan that is somewhat different from the tradi- 
tional  one that  has  dominated Japan’s  corporate sector  for more than  four 
decades. Thus, we should be much more positive in liberalizing Japanese capi- 
tal markets. 
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Comment  Won-Am Park 
Horiuchi argues quite interestingly that the active issue of convertible bonds 
by  well-established  Japanese firms during  the financial liberalization  in the 
1980s created  distortions.  This happened  because  the  managers  of  well- 
established firms tended to utilize convertibles to increase their perquisite ex- 
penditures  instead of  requisite expenditures, while small firms were not al- 
lowed to issue convertible bonds. The author thinks that small firms should 
have been allowed to issue convertible bonds to mitigate the agency problem 
existing between shareholders and creditors (debtholders). 
These arguments, unfortunately, are not entirely convincing. First, imperfect 
information will not accord with full-scale financial liberalization as shown in 
the credit-rationing literature. In contrast, the author seems to argue that fuller 
financial liberalization, particularly in corporate finance, is desirable because 
of asymmetric information  and easily misguided  corporate governance. The 
author  must  clarify  why  imperfect information  does not  support  credit  ra- 
tioning but requires fuller financial liberalization. 
Second, the author does not provide a consistent explanation for perquisite 
expenditure or “pet” investment by managers of well-established firms. It ap- 
pears that managers of those firms were eager to reap large capital gains by 
issuing convertible bonds at extremely low coupon rates when investors had 
strong bullish expectations about the firms’ stock prices. This is the asymmet- 
ric information problem between insiders and outsiders. Then the paper reads 
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as if this would not explain Japanese capital markets in the latter half of the 
1980s because shareholders did not concurrently reduce their equity positions 
nor did Japanese firms reduce the share of internal funds in the total amount of 
funds. The author should explain this conflicting evidence in a consistent way. 
Third, the panel-data econometric studies are shown in table 6.7 to confirm 
that  convertible  bond  issues  financed perquisite  expenditure.  However,  the 
econometric investigation in table 6.7 needs to be refined. The panel data could 
be rearranged to remove too many zeros in convertible bond issues (it has been 
said that nearly 80 percent of convertible bond issue data are zeros). The fixed- 
effect regression, as well as the random-effect regression, should be done as a 
robustness check. In addition, time dummy variables or time-varying coeffi- 
cient estimation should be included because eligibility requirements  for con- 
vertible bonds issues have been loosened gradually (table 6.5). The finding that 
more convertible bond issues led to lower profit rates may not be evidence that 
convertible bond issues financed perquisite expenditures. Even if convertible 
bond issues financed  requisite investments, operating profit rates could have 
gone down in the beginning as new equipment was installed. Considering all 
these aspects, it will be better to investigate whether more convertible bond 
issues led to lower stock prices. 
The author does not carry out empirical tests on the responses of stock prices 
of individual firms to issues of convertible bonds for some ambiguous reasons. 
My hunch is that more convertible bond issues by  well-established firms were 
associated with higher stock prices because outside investors had bullish ex- 
pectations of  stock prices  in the latter half of the  198Os, and because  most 
shareholders were outsiders who care about stock prices. In this situation, man- 
agers  of  well-established  firms,  as  insiders,  would  issue  more  convertible 
bonds to finance both requisite and perquisite investments at low coupon rates. 
The asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders would create dis- 
tortions in the capital market. However, the distortions  did not  seem severe 
enough to bring about significant changes in equity positions and less reliance 
on internal finance. This is my explanation for the conflicting evidence on the 
profit-seeking activities of the managers of well-established firms. 
Overall, the conclusions drawn in this paper could change with a more bal- 
anced view of the Japanese experience with corporate bond market liberaliza- 
tion. Managers  of well-established  firms might behave as insiders. If  this is 
true in the case of well-established  firms, it will also be true in the case of 
small firms. Managers of small firms will take advantage of their insider posi- 
tion once they are allowed to issue convertible bonds. As long as outside invest- 
ors have bullish expectations of stock prices, the agency problem of small firms 
will not be cured by the issuance of  convertible bonds. Actually convertible 
bond  issues  by  small  firms  will  emphasize the  insider-outsider  problem. 
Viewed in this way, one can justify Japan’s gradual approach to corporate bond 
market liberalization. 